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CHAINED AGAINST HER WILL: WHAT A GET MEANS FOR 




Under halachic laws, when a Jewish couple undergoes a 
divorce, Jewish law requires the marriage to be terminated by both 
civil law and religious law.1  The delivering of a divorce document, 
called a get under Jewish law, initiates the process.2  Essentially, 
without a get, the couple is not considered divorced and neither spouse 
may remarry until the document is signed.3  However, the 
consequences are far more severe and life changing for women.4   
For instance, without a get, a Jewish woman cannot remarry 
and is viewed as an adulterer if she engages in sexual intercourse with 
 
* I am a Juris Doctor candidate at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center and a CUNY 
Queens College graduate.  I dedicate this Note to the memory of my late grandmother, Frida 
Kariyeva, whose love and support inspired me to make it this far.  For all the times she picked 
me up when I fell down and could not get back up on my own—I know that her encouragement 
contributed in many ways to my academic achievement.  May her soul rest peacefully.  
Furthermore, I would like to dedicate this Note to my professors, friends, and loved ones who 
helped me along the way.  Your acts of kindness and support are greatly appreciated.  
1 Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, and the First 
Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 319 (1992) (“A civil divorce has no effect in the eyes of 
halacha, and any subsequent cohabitation or remarriage in the absence of a get is regarded as 
adulterous.”).  I will discuss this in depth throughout this Note. 
2 Id.  Today, with all the different types of movements of Judaism present in the United 
States, the common groups continue to be the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform.  As it 
seems, those who strictly comply with halachic laws not only adhere to the get requirement 
but also believe that they are bound to it.  Jews who categorize themselves as a part of the 
Reform Movement believe that halachic law only guides them and does not bind them to a get 
requirement.  Furthermore, the Reform Movement even goes as far as extinguishing the get 
requirement and recognizes that a civil divorce is enough to end the union. 
3 Id.  (“A halachically valid marriage may be terminated in only two ways: through death 
of a spouse, or by the granting of a get.”). 
4 See infra note 8. 
1
Kariyeva: Chained Against Her Will
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
758 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
other men.5  Furthermore, if she has children without a get from her 
previous husband, those children are considered mamzerim.6  
Mamzerim are children who are born from forbidden relationships.7  
Because of the stigma placed on children born under this status, they 
are not allowed to marry freely within the Jewish community.8  This 
stigma is life changing, especially for religious Jews who believe that 
a woman’s primary responsibility in halacha is to have a family and 
children.9  Nevertheless, many husbands who refuse to deliver a get to 
their wives can leave them in a “dead” marriage, which is known as 
the agunah problem.10  
Once the husband delivers a get, the wife can accept it.11  If a 
wife does not cooperate with the husband’s demand for a get, the 
 
5 See Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 323-24 (citing GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH 
LAW 159-60 (1973)). 
6 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin 5b, http://www.come-and-hear.com/gittin/gittin_5.html 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2018) (“If the bearer of a Get from foreign parts gave it to the wife 
without declaring, ‘In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed,’ if she 
marries again the second husband must put her away and a child born from the union is a 
mamzer.” (citation omitted)). 
7 Id.  The Babylonian Talmud calls it “[t]he product of an incestuous union.”  Id. at n.8. 
8 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 324.  The consequences of not having a get affect the 
children’s reputations and marital status.  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 324.  Mamzerim are 
permitted to only marry converts to Judaism or other mamzerim.  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 
324 n.48.  This concept is different from having illegitimate children.  Breitowitz, supra note 
1, at 324.  Illegitimate children, those who are born out of wedlock, do not carry this stigma.  
Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 324.  We can see how grave the consequences are for a woman to 
have children with another man without obtaining a get from her previous husband. 
9 Lisa Zornberg, Beyond the Constitution: Is the New York Get Legislation Good Law, 15 
PACE L. REV. 703, 704 (1995).  A woman’s primary religious responsibility in halacha is to 
nurture Jewish values within the domestic sphere.  M. MEISELMAN, JEWISH WOMAN IN JEWISH 
LAW 16-18 (1978);  see also Sara Esther Crispe, The Role of Women in Judaism, CHABAD.ORG, 
https://www.chabad.org/theJewishWoman/article_cdo/aid/376141/jewish/The-Role-of-
Women-in-Judaism.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2018) (“For every woman, single or married, 
with children or without children, is able to bear fruit, is able to be an eizer kenegdo. . . . [T]his 
is fulfilling the commandment of ‘to be fruitful and multiply’ . . . .” (citing GENESIS 1:28)).  
The literal translation of eizer kenegdo is a “helpmate to [the husband].”  Id. 
10 The literal translation of agunah is “chained.”  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 313 n.3.  It is 
a term used to describe a Jewish woman who is “chained” to her marriage.  Breitowitz, supra 
note 1, at 313 n.3.  The plural form is agunot.  Refusing to comply with the get process, as 
an act of spite or demanding certain terms before agreeing to give one, has become the 
modern equivalence of the biblical and historical agunah problem.  I will discuss the agunah 
problem in greater detail later on in this Note, including the modern agunah problem—get 
extortion.  See discussion of the modern agunah problem infra Part III.B. 
11 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 320; see also Jewish Divorce and the Civil Law, 12 DEPAUL 
L.REV. 295, 299 (1963) (“It is the husband who gives the divorce and not the court. . . .  The 
function of the Religious Court in Jewish Law is that of a passive participant.  Its role is to 
attempt to dissuade the parties and counsel them against proceeding with the divorce. . . .  
The justification for this is that by legally severing their relation the couple is fulfilling their 
2
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implications are far less severe for the husband.12  That is because, a 
man may have sexual intercourse with other women without being 
branded as an adulterer, and if any children are born from a subsequent 
relationship, the children are not stigmatized as mamzerim.13  
Furthermore, if the husband believes that his wife is unreasonable for 
not accepting the get, he can be set free from the get requirement by 
receiving one hundred signatures from rabbis.14  Jewish women cannot 
receive a hundred signatures from rabbis to “free” themselves from 
their “dead” marriages, although, now, many rabbis refuse to marry a 
couple unless a prenuptial agreement is signed or community pressure 
is applied for men to comply with the get requirements.  It is unclear 
how many women fall under the definition of agunah today.15 
Many states have tried forcing husbands to issue a get based on 
the civil enforcement of the ketubah.16  Further awakened by the issue 
and the complexities of the agunah, New York, specifically, has 
enacted legislation to help.17  In 1986, the New York legislature 
enacted Section 253 of the Domestic Relations Law—removal of 
religious barriers—to solve the agunah problem.18  The statute states 
that a party cannot receive an annulment or divorce unless the party 
claims in a verified complaint that the party took all the steps 
necessary, to the best of his or her knowledge, to remove any barrier 
to the defendant’s remarriage.19  There was a lot of backlash when this 
statute was enacted because of the well-rooted constitutional right 
found in the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and Free 
 
state of mind and heart and the court is merely asked to sanction this state.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
12 See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
13 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 323-24. 
14 A process known as Heter Me’ah Rabbanim (“Dispensation of 100 Rabbis”).  Breitowitz, 
supra note 1, at 325. 
15 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 315.  Many scholars have differed in opinion and have not 
been able to come up with a common figure.  See Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 316 nn.5-6 
(citing GEORGIA DULLEA, Orthodox Jewish Divorce: The Religious Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 5, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/05/style/orthodox-jewish-divorce-the- 
religious-dilemma.html (estimating 150,000 agunah) and RABBI MENDEL EPSTEIN, A 
WOMAN’S GUIDE TO THE GET PROCESS 2 (1989) (estimating that “there are no more than 50 
women who meet the basic definition of agunah”)).  Whatever the exact figure may be today, 
this is a rude awakening.  The disparity between the two figures is deeply concerning.  Many 
factors may be contributing; however, one thing remains certain: every case shows us how 
easily manipulated the religious process can be when faced with selfish motives. 
16 See infra Part II.A. 
17 See infra Part IV. 
18 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1986). 
19 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 2018). 
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Exercise Clause.20  Despite the statute’s inability to be successfully 
challenged in civil court, it brews a lot of controversy for proponents 
of Jewish law because the Mishnah (Yevamot 14:1) states that a man 
cannot divorce his wife under coercion;21 it must be made under his 
own free will.22  Therefore, the judicial involvement in such 
circumstances raises questions of halachic validity, looking to the 
context in which the get was ordered and subject to strict scrutiny by 
rabbis.23  
Some rabbis have proposed a modern solution to securing a get 
through the use of prenuptial support agreements.24  Prenuptial support 
agreements encourage husbands to give a get, which encourages 
secular law to aid agunot.  However, this proposed solution remains an 
issue because some people believe that premarital agreements created 
to encourage the husband to give his wife a get undercut Jewish law 
and are coerced.25  Furthermore, Jewish law, presumably, did not 
foresee the coming of the modern agunot problem in regard to get 
extortion26 which arises from the unparalleled power that a husband 
has over his wife.27  Extortion occurs when the husband consents to 
give his wife a get only if she agrees, for example, to give up her 
 
20 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”). 
21 The Mishnah is an edited record of the complex oral Torah laws.  It was published after 
the destruction of the Second Temple.  Yevamot 14:1 is a rule derived from Deuteronomy 24:1.  
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.  It says, “A man who wishes to divorce his wife is 
not like a woman who seeks divorce from her husband.  A woman is divorced in accordance 
with her will or against her will.  A man cannot divorce his wife except of his own free will.”  
Mishnah (Yevamot 14:1). 
22 Zornberg, supra note 9, at 709. 
23 See generally Breitowitz, supra note 1. 
24 See infra Part II.B. 
25 See generally Asher Maoz, The Impact of Jewish Law on Contemporary Legal Systems 
With Special Reference to Human Rights, OLIR (Nov. 2004), at 2-3, https://www.olir.it/ 
areetematiche/73/documents/maoz_milano2003.pdf (quoting Ch. Povarsky, The Enforcement 
of a Jewish Marriage Contract in a Civil Court, JEWISH L. REP. 1, 2-3 (2000) (“Jewish religion 
and law are a single entity.  The Torah makes no dogmatic distinction between religious 
teaching and legal provisions.  In addition, Judaism is an ethical system, teaching a moral way 
of life: Jewish law is a combined system, consisting of law, religion and morality.  These three 
elements are intertwined and interrelated, and form one system, known as Halacha, which 
means a way of life.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
26 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra Part III. 
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property rights, pay a large sum, or make concessions on child 
custody.28 
This Note will be divided into five parts.  Part II of this Note 
will examine the historical and biblical implications of marriage and 
divorce in Judaism.  In this part, I will explain and analyze the case 
law that led to the civil enforcement of the ketubah to obtain a get and 
the requirements to initiate the get process.  Part III will discuss the 
historical agunah and how the issue has changed in the modern world.  
Part IV will consider the issues associated with the enforcement of the 
ketubah and the issuance of a get under the First Amendment.  I will 
argue that the New York Get Law is constitutional under the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and discuss its function.  
Finally, Part V will conclude and summarize my arguments.  It is 
important to understand why such an issue exists in the first place and 
why it cannot be easily eradicated.  Questions of halachic validity arise 
because the Jewish courts and American courts are different.29  Though 
a judge may issue an order compelling a husband to give his wife a get, 
the question of whether this is a halachically valid divorce agreement 
in the realm of Jewish law still remains a sticky topic.  It may very well 
be that there is no real solution that can extinguish this problem. 
II. HISTORICAL AND BIBLICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE  
Judaism does not forbid divorce, as it is seen within the Torah 
as a common occurrence.30  Furthermore, the Talmud explains that the 
“altar sheds tears” and that there is no need to continue a marriage in 
which one, or both, parties are miserable.31  Jewish marriage comprises 
 
28 See infra Part III. 
29 See generally Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional 
Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1997); see also 
generally Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction to Legislation in Jewish Law, with References to 
the American Legal System, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 916 (1999). 
30 Deuteronomy 24:1-4. 
31 The literal translation of Talmud is “study.” It is comprised of the documents that 
comment on the Mishnah.  See supra note 21.  It is a central text in Judaism and discusses 
Jewish history, law, and customs.  There are two Talmuds: the Jerusalem Talmud and the 
Babylonian Talmud.  The Babylonian Talmud is easier to comprehend, which is important 
since the Talmud is difficult to understand.  See  RABBI PERRY NETTER, DIVORCE IS A MITZVAH: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FINDING WHOLENESS AND HOLINESS WHEN YOUR MARRIAGE DIES 76-
77 (2002) (“It is at the altar that God cries about divorce.  God cries about divorce not because 
God is judging us as sinners, as so many people believe.  God cries not because God is 
5
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two components: spiritual and practical.32  Judaism advances the 
notion that every bride and groom must spiritually reenact Adam and 
Eve’s physical and spiritual “one flesh” and further reminds the couple 
of the importance to live by the laws of “Moses and Israel.”33  The 
practicality of marriage under Jewish law is that the marriage is 
executed by the ketubah and can include the terms of divorce.34 
A. Civil Enforcement of the Ketubah to Obtain a Get 
The marriage ceremony is initiated when the couple signs a 
document called a ketubah, which is the Jewish marriage contract.35  It 
is a document, traditionally signed by two witnesses, that is presented 
and belongs exclusively to the wife as her property.36  The purpose of 
the ketubah, and the reason it is the sole property of the wife, is to deter 
the husband from exercising the unilateral power to secure a divorce.37  
However, the ketubah also defines the parameters of the new 
relationship as well as personal status of the couple.38 
It is possible for a wife to be successful in the civil enforcement 
of her ketubah.  To help compel a husband to grant her a get, the 
interpretation of the ketubah must be made under neutral principles of 
contract law, rendering it not an entanglement of the courts with issues 
of religion.39  There have been numerous attempts in some states to 
 
disappointed in our failure, as so many rabbis teach.  God cries because God, like, us, is in 
pain and cries with us.”).  This note refers to the Babylonian Talmud, hereinafter TALMUD. 
32 See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
33 See generally Breitowitz, supra note 1. 
34 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 343. 
35 See generally Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 343. 
36 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 343; see also Jodi M. Solovy, Civil Enforcement of Jewish 
Marriage and Divorce Constitutional Accommodation of a Religious Mandate, 45 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 493, 495 (1996).   
37 See Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 347 (noting that one of the original purposes of a ketubah 
was to promise to give financial security by “the creation of a lien on all real or personal 
property . . . to secure . . . all obligations under the ketubah”).   
38 The document shows deep commitment and responsibility.  See TALMUD (Megillah 29a).  
It provides the new married couple with a framework for mutual respect that would enable 
trust, openness, and love.  Id.  It aids in the fulfillment of a goal—the building of a Mikdash 
Me’at, translated to a small temple.  Id. (“God will dwell in the holy places [we] create, for 
they are miniature temples.”). 
39 See infra Part IV. 
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force a husband to give a get, normally characterized as “specific 
performance” actions.40 
Cases such as In re Marriage of Goldman,41 Avitzur v. 
Avitzur,42 and Minkin v. Minkin43 are examples of successful civil 
enforcement of the ketubah, compelling the husband to give a get.  In 
these cases, the courts were able to compel a get through specific 
performance without infringing on the husband’s constitutional 
rights.44  Specifically, these courts determined that ordering the 
husband to give the get as part of the litigants’ marital contract would 
not infringe on his First Amendment rights.45  However, many 
Rabbinical authorities have held that a get given subsequent to a civil 
order is coercive in nature, thus, invalidating it, which leaves the wife 
with no true sense of achievement.46  
A question that has posed a great deal of inconsistency in the 
New Jersey courts is whether a court can compel a husband to submit 
to the jurisdiction’s beth din47 to initiate the get proceeding without 
violating the Establishment Clause.48  In Minkin,49 the trial court ruled 
under the premise that giving a get is not a religious act, and forcing a 
 
40 In these types of cases, the parties have attempted to use the terms of the ketubah, 
enforcing it as a contract, to require the husband to act in accordance with the laws of “Moses 
and Israel,” compelling the husband to grant the get.  This means that the litigants would 
attempt to have the ketubah specifically performed, ordering the husband to abide by its terms.  
As we will come to see, there are many issues with the use of the ketubah as a neutral contract 
principle, one of them being the required proof mandating the ketubah to give a get, without 
the courts having to settle the matter through interpretations of religious text. 
41 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
42 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983). 
43 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (holding that compelling a husband to issue 
a get was a proper enforcement of the Jewish marriage contract). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See generally Breitowitz, supra note 1. 
47 The translation for beth din is “house of judgment.”  A Beth Din is the rabbinical court 
of Judaism, commonly comprised of three rabbis, that is empowered to rule on matters of 
Jewish law and who make sure that everything is done precisely in accordance to Jewish law, 
thus making the process a valid one.  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 326.  Under Jewish law, if 
the husband fails to comply with the beth din order to give a get, it may issue a seruv—an 
order of contempt to a husband who refuses to comply.  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 326.  
When ordered, it is considered that the husband lifted his hand against the Torah, subjecting 
him to the punishment of being shunned for being non-compliant.  See generally Breitowitz, 
supra note 1, at 326. 
48 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
49 Minkin, 434 A.2d at 668. 
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husband to submit to the jurisdiction’s beth din would “neither advance 
nor inhibit religion.”50 
Over a decade later, after Minkin, the New Jersey trial court in 
Aflalo v. Aflalo51 held that compelling the husband to give a get would 
violate his right to free exercise of religion.52  It further stated that the 
Establishment Clause did not permit the court to compel the husband 
to submit to the beth din to initiate get proceedings.53  The court 
rationalized its decision by stating that there was no value in a get when 
it was ordered by a civil court because such an act went against the 
halachic requirement that a get must be given willingly and without 
restraint for the wife to truly be free.54  
Similarly, in Victor v. Victor,55 the Arizona court denied 
specific performance as a remedy, claiming that the ketubah contained 
“no specific terms describing a mutual understanding that [a] husband 
would secure a Jewish divorce.”56  Furthermore, courts in Florida, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio have also refused to enforce the marital 
contract either because of the fear that doing so would excessively 
entangle the state with religious matters, violating the Establishment 
Clause, or because such an order would go beyond the court’s 
jurisdiction.57  In Price v. Price,58 the Pennsylvania court denied the 
wife’s request for specific performance, stating that forcing a religious 
divorce may not only violate the Establishment Clause but also the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
 
50 Id. 
51 685 A.2d 523 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996).   
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 530.  The court in Aflalo questioned why the civil court should order such relief if 
the beth din would not do so.  Id.  It further believed that if the husband could be coerced into 
giving a get, the beth din ought to be the one coercing.  Aflalo, 685 A.2d at 530.  The general 
fear by this court was that “[by] coercing the husband, the civil court is, in essence, overruling 
or superseding any judgment which the Beth Din can or will enter, contrary to accepted First 
Amendment principles.”  Id. 
55 866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). 
56 Id. at 902. 
57 See Turner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (holding that ordering 
the husband to cooperate with a get was unenforceable statutorily but could be enforced as a 
simple contract), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1967); Steinberg v. Steinberg, No. 44125, 
1982 WL 2446 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (holding the compelling of a get unenforceable); Price 
v. Price, 16 Pa. D. & C. 290, 291 (1932) (holding that the court did not have a right to force 
anyone to consent to any kind of divorce, civil or religious). 
58 Price, 16 Pa. D. & C. at 291.  The court reasoned that “[t]he civil tribunals are . . . without 
authority to order one to follow the practices of his faith.  This is a matter dependent entirely 
upon his conscience, or upon his religious belief.”  Id. 
8
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Despite the few courts that have denied the enforcement of the 
ketubah to give a get, other jurisdictions have allowed it.59  When the 
wife in Koeppel v. Koeppel60 brought an action against her husband to 
compel him to grant her a get pursuant to their civil divorce, the 
husband moved for dismissal, arguing that compulsion would violate 
his First Amendment rights.61  The New York court was not 
persuaded.62  Rather, it stated:  
Complying with his agreement would not compel the 
defendant to practice any religion . . . . His appearance 
before the Rabbinate to answer questions and give 
evidence needed . . . is not a profession of faith. Specific 
performance . . . would merely require the defendant to 
do what he voluntarily agreed to do. . . . especially if it 
will bring peace of mind and conscience to one whom 
defendant must at one time have loved.63 
In Margulies v. Margulies,64 another New York case, the 
husband openly agreed in court to give his wife a get, the stipulation 
being incorporated into a court order.65  The husband ignored the order 
and, as a result, was held in contempt of court twice.66  However, he 
was given the opportunity to either purge himself, subjecting him to 
fines and other penalties, or appear in front of the beth din and 
participate in the get proceedings.67  He continued to fail to comply 
with the court order and was sentenced to fifteen days in jail.68  
Margulies is an interesting case because the court agreed with the 
husband’s argument that the court did not have the power to force him 
to comply with religious proceedings; however, the court still imposed 
 
59 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. 
60 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
61 Id. at 373. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  After the trial, the court held the marriage contract unenforceable and too indefinite 
to support a judgment for specific performance.  See also Koeppel v. Koeppel, 161 N.Y.S.2d 
694 (App. Div. 1957) (stating that the language of the agreement obligated the husband to give 
his wife a get only if it were necessary). 
64 344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 1973). 
65 Id. at 484. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id.  The Appellate Division reversed the order of the fifteen days in jail, but it imposed 
the fines instead.  Margulies, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 484. 
9
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the fines.69  The importance of this case reflects the court’s ability to 
be open to the enforceability of the ketubah, despite the court’s lack of 
authority and desire to do so.70  The court did this by imposing less 
severe penalties on the husband (i.e., using the court’s authority to 
bypass the issue involving the ketubah).71 
In some instances where there was no express agreement 
regarding a get, few courts have allowed an inference of an express 
agreement to give or receive a get.72  The courts’ rationale behind the 
inference was that the parties performed their marriage through 
religious tradition and in “accordance with the laws of Moses and 
Israel,” or through the execution of the ketubah.73  A case from Canada, 
Morris v. Morris,74 was the first case seeking an order from a court to 
compel a get from a reluctant husband on the grounds that the ketubah 
served as a “civilly enforceable contract to grant a get upon civil 
dissolution and entered an order of specific performance.”75  The 
question presented to the court was whether a woman was able to 
compel her husband to grant a religious divorce through the civil court 
in situations where the husband refused to give a get, thus prohibiting 
remarriage.76  The court answered in the affirmative, holding that the 
ketubah was an enforceable contract that allowed for specific 
performance.77  Despite its uphill and inconsistent battle, the ketubah 
has been used to uphold a get and has been accepted by many courts.78 
In a New Jersey case, Burns v. Burns,79 the wife was granted a 
civil divorce judgment but sought an order that would compel her ex-
husband to issue a get.80  The court, which had relied on Minkin,81 held 
that whenever there was a case of civil dissolution, the ketubah would 
 
69 Id. 
70 See generally Breitowitz, supra note 1. 
71 Margulies, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 484.  Although the court did not uphold the enforcement of 
the ketubah to give a get, it upheld the fines based on procedural grounds, thus imposing a less 
severe penalty for the husband’s non-compliance.  Id. 
72 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 343. 
73 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 343. 
74 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 343 (citing 36 D.L.R.3d 447, rev’d, 42 D.L.R.3d 550 (1973)). 
75 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 343. 
76 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 343. 
77 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 344.  The decision was later reversed by the Manitoba Court 
of Appeals, and the wife did not seek further review.  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 344. 
78 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. 
79 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). 
80 Id. 
81 Minkin, 434 A.2d at 668. 
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impose an obligation to dissolve the marriage.82  Thus, the court 
compelled the parties to “submit [to] the jurisdiction of the Jewish 
ecclesiastical court, the ‘Bet[h] Din,’ and initiate the procedure to 
secure a ‘get’ [was] within the equity powers of [that] court.”83  In 
denying the husband’s free exercise claim, the court, in dicta, held that 
a “true religious belief is not compromised as the amount of money 
offered or demanded is increased.”84  The court further noted that 
“[t]his so-called ‘offer’ is akin to extortion.”85  Although the court did 
not explicitly direct an order to the husband to initiate the get, it did 
order him to submit to the rabbinical court and initiate the procedure 
based on an inference of an express agreement.86  
B. Securing a Get Through Prenuptial Support 
Agreements  
Prenuptial support agreements have been another indirect 
mechanism in helping secure a get.87  Even though the ketubah 
generally spells out the promises a husband makes toward his wife, 
Jewish law mandates that a husband be obligated to support his wife 
 
82 Burns, 538 A.2d at 438. 
83 Id. at 441 (citation omitted). 
84 Id. at 440.  By examining the testimony offered, the court reasoned that the husband’s 
refusal to give a get was based not on his religious beliefs but rather on monetary gain.  Id. 
85 Id. (citation omitted). 
86 Burns, 538 A.2d at 438. 
87 See Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 347. 
These promises, all of which are made by the husband to the wife, include: 
(1) a declaration that he has betrothed his wife in accordance with the 
laws of Moses and Israel; 
(2) a promise that he will honor, support, and work for his spouse in 
accordance with the custom of Jewish husbands; 
(3) an obligation to provide food, clothing, and intimacy in accordance 
“with universal custom”; 
(4) an agreement to pay an alimony lump sum of 200 silver zuz in the 
event of divorce or death; 
(5) an agreement to pay a stipulated monetary value for property that the 
wife brings into the marriage; 
(6) a promise to pay an additional alimony sum in excess of the statutory 
minimum; and  
(7) the creation of a lien on all real or personal property, whether 
presently owned or after-acquired, to secure payment of all 
obligations under the ketubah.  
See Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 347 (footnotes omitted). 
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both physically and financially.88  In Israel, rabbinical courts have the 
authority to rule on matters regarding marital support because they 
have broad authority over such issues.89  These courts create pressure 
on a reluctant husband to execute a get.90  Forcing high money 
judgments puts pressure on the husband; however, because the only 
way to stop the support obligation would be through dissolving the 
marriage, high money judgments act as a major factor in deterring a 
husband from denying his wife a get.91 
In prenuptial agreements, the couple agrees to “submit to the 
jurisdiction of a rabbinical court in the event of marital dissolution, and 
to abide by contractual provisions that either encourage or require the 
delivery or acceptance of a get.”92 
The prenuptial agreement has numerous advantages: it 
works preemptively rather than after the problem has 
already arisen; it can be uniformly implemented on a 
national level; and finally, while prenuptial agreements 
are designed to be legally enforceable, many rabbis hail 
the fact that they encourage spouses to resolve their 
problems in rabbinical, not secular, courts.93 
Thus, in an attempt to incentivize husbands to give their wives 
a get, some rabbis have drafted prenuptial agreements.94  Specifically, 
the Rabbinical Council of America (hereinafter “RCA”) endorsed the 
prenuptial agreement drafted by Rabbi Mordechai Willig, which 
makes it an obligation for a husband to make fixed payments to his 
wife beginning from separation and ending once he grants her the get.95  
 
88 SHULCHAN ARUKH, Even HaEzer 70:1.  The Shulchan Aruckh is known as the code of 
Jewish law and is consulted by many Jewish communities.  Once a marriage is dissolved 
through divorce, Jewish law does not recognize any obligations for support, other than the 
one-time payment of 200 zuz. 
89 See generally Yehiel S. Kaplan, Enforcement of Divorce Judgments in Jewish Courts in 
Israel: The Interaction Between Religious and Constitutional Law, MIDDLE EAST L. & 
GOVERNANCE 4 (2012). 
90 Id. at 22. 
91 Id. 
92 Zornberg, supra note 9, at 768. 
93 Zornberg, supra note 9, at 768. 
94 See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
95 A Powerful Advance to Prevent Using Jewish Law to Cause Human Suffering,  
RABBINICAL COUNCIL AM. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id= 
105862.  Here, the RCA issued a statement naming Rabbi Willig’s halachic prenuptial 
agreement as an “effective way to prevent get-abuse.”  Id. 
12
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Prenuptial agreements create no halachic concerns.96  Because the 
husband refuses to grant the get, thereby keeping the couple religiously 
married, he subjects himself to the Jewish law that a husband must 
support his wife for as long as they are married.97  Rabbi Kenneth 
Brander stated, “All we’re doing is actualizing in very definitive terms 
what his responsibilities are as he is not willing to change that [marital] 
status quo and give the get.”98 
Though prenuptial agreements have many advantages, they 
might have some disadvantages.99  Like any law passed, it is only as 
effective as the officials making the effort to enforce it.100  Here, 
although the prenuptial agreement is not one mandated by Jewish law, 
the solution to the agunah problem (i.e., using a prenuptial agreement 
as a vehicle to receive a get) can only truly be effective if the 
community rabbis agree to use them.101  Today, some rabbis agree to 
perform the marriage ceremony on the condition that a prenuptial 
agreement between the couple is executed.102  However, most rabbis 
disagree with the notion of a prenuptial agreement altogether, fearing 





98 Zornberg, supra note 9, at 769 (quoting Telephone Interview with Kenneth Brander, 
Orthodox Rabbi, Chair, RCA Committee on prenuptial agreements (Feb. 16, 1994)). 
99 Ben Sales, Orthodox Rabbis’ Group Mandates Prenup To Prevent ‘Chained’ Wives, 
JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Sept. 23, 2016, 5:48 PM), https://www.jta.org/2016/09/23/ 
news-opinion/united-states/orthodox-rabbis-group-mandates-prenup-to-prevent-chained-
wives.  Disadvantages arise because, as mentioned, there are rabbis that oppose the notion of 
a halachic prenuptial and actively discourage them from getting one.  See id.  Those rabbis 
who are not opposed to the prenuptials, like Rabbi Mark Dratch, believe that it would be 
difficult to enforce such a resolution because rabbis who are pro-prenuptial are not present to 
execute every wedding.  See id. 
100 Id. (explaining that some rabbis “either don’t require the prenup or actively discourage 
couples they are marrying from signing one.”). 
101 Id. (“The Rabbinical Council of America will mandate its member rabbis to require 
couples to sign a prenuptial agreement ensuring that husbands will not withhold a ‘get,’ or 
Jewish writ of divorce, from their wives.”). 
102 Sales, supra note 99 (“Among some 200 mostly American Orthodox rabbis surveyed 
earlier [in the year 2016] by the Jewish Orthodox Feminist Association, approximately 75 
percent already require couples to sign the prenup before getting married.”). 
103 See Zornberg, supra note 9, at 768.  Some rabbis believe that the fear of prenuptial 
agreements leading to dissolution of marriage is something that can be overcome if more 
rabbis explained to marrying couples that the point of the prenuptial agreement was evidence 
of love and responsibility toward the one another in the event that a change in the relationship 
would occur.  See Zornberg, supra note 9, at 768 (“If prenuptial agreements would be signed 
routinely at every wedding, we could wipe out this problem entirely.” (citation omitted)). 
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As discussed, the prenuptial agreement was created in the effort 
to discourage a husband from turning his wife into an agunah.104  
Furthermore, it was also created with the goal to stop the wife from 
becoming a victim of get extortion.105  It protects the wife from a 
husband who abuses Jewish law as a mechanism of extorting money, 
property, and custody through the wife during the divorce 
proceedings.106  It is important to conceptualize that a prenuptial 
agreement does not expressly grant a get at a time of dissolution, as 
that would compromise the husband’s free will.107  A prenuptial 
agreement simply enforces the husband’s obligation to support his 
wife, something expressly provided for in the ketubah.108  Today, 
many women’s rights activists and some rabbis are pushing for more 
halachic solutions.109  Though a prenuptial agreement may have some 
drawbacks and is not ideal for some, it is a step toward a solution to 
help free the agunot.110 
Making a get invalid relies upon the finding that it was 
executed under any form of duress or compulsion.111  An issue that 
arises once a get has been deemed executed under duress or 
compulsion is whether the penalty was contractually assumed.112  
Jewish law has recognized many situations where a husband could 
divorce his wife through compulsion.113  Though the idea of a 
 
104 See discussion of this concept infra Part III. 
105 See infra Part III. 
106 See infra Part III. 
107 A get must be given under the husband’s free will in order to constitute a valid divorce 
under Jewish law.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
108 See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
110 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
111 The invalidity of a get is called a get meusah.  This is a big obstacle for any woman 
seeking a religious divorce, since a get must be given with the husband’s consent and under 
his free will.  As discussed in the previous paragraphs, what plays a major role in whether this 
obstacle can be overcome is based on civil enforcement and prenuptial agreements.  However, 
issues still arise.  Generally, civil courts have no say past the civil divorce proceeding.  A civil 
court may have the authority to compel a reluctant husband to grant his wife a get, but the 
husband may still go before the Jewish court and say that the only reason he is there is because 
of compulsion of that civil court, making the religious divorce proceeding technically invalid.  
See generally TALMUD, Gittin 88b. 
112 See Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 331 n.73.  The idea that transactions entered under duress 
are voidable is similar to American law.  See Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 331 n.73 (“The fact 
that duress is recognized as a basis for the invalidation of a get—such a get is void, not merely 
voidable—underscores the crucial importance of consent and the problematic nature of 
judicial coercion.”). 
113 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 333 n.80. 
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compelled get goes against the rule that a get must be granted without 
duress or compulsion, the Talmud briefly states that if the husband is 
forced until he states, “I am willing,”114 then it is to be considered a 
valid divorce decree.  Although the consent must be formally 
expressed, it can be encouraged through applying any type of 
psychological, financial, or physical pressure.115  Another situation 
where compelling a get would remain valid is when the event did not 
arise from the purpose of influencing a get.116  A contemporary 
example would be a “separation agreement where one spouse agrees 
to forego property or custody rights in exchange for a get.”117  
However, it seems that under these circumstances, by granting the get 
and holding it valid, the husband confers a benefit simply because he 
would be escaping financial burdens that would have been his 
responsibility had the get not been executed.118  Financial burdening 
 
The Talmud enumerates a number of specified grounds that enable a 
woman to petition for divorce, and later authorities have supplemented the 
list: 
1. If her husband becomes afflicted with certain loathsome diseases 
after marriage or even if the disease predated the marriage but, as of 
the date of the marriage, its existence was unknown to her. 
2. Impotence or sterility. 
3. Failure to provide material support. 
4. Refusal to cohabitate. 
5. Physical or verbal abuse. 
6. Husband forces wife to violate religious law. 
7. Husband is engaged in certain occupations that are physically repulsive – dung 
gathering, tanning hides. 
8. Husband becomes an apostate. 
9. Habitual infidelity. 
Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 333 n.80. 
114 TALMUD, Yebamoth 106a, https://www.halakhah.com/yebamoth/yebamoth_106.html. 
115 Id.  “He is subjected to pressure until he says, ‘I am willing.’ And so you find in the case 
of letters of divorce for women: The man is subjected to pressure until he says, ‘I am willing.’”  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
116 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 335.  The category arose under the Spanish authority, Rivash. 
This case was about a person who was imprisoned for not paying a debt, an event completely 
unrelated to the get. His wife’s relatives had offered to help with the debt, thus releasing him 
from prison, conditioned upon him giving his wife a get. Here, there was no objection to the 
get, “for he was not seized in order to [compel] him to divorce [his wife] but on account of his 
debt; the get is not coerced but [the product] of free will.”  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 335. 
117 Id. 
118 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-76 (2018).  As an example, imagine 
someone threatening to drown another person unless he or she agrees to the contract versus 
offering to save an already drowning person if he or she agrees to the contract.  In the former, 
any contract created under such coercive circumstances would be void by means of duress.  In 
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undoubtedly is a factor in what gave rise to the modern agunah 
problem—get extortion.119 
III. THE AGUNAH PROBLEM  
A Jewish woman who seeks a divorce from her husband must 
often times pay for her freedom to encourage her husband to give her 
a get and exercise his free will when doing so.120  She may ultimately 
give up her rights to child support, marital property, or burden herself 
financially to rid herself from the bonds of a failed marriage.121  In a 
worst-case scenario, the wife may still unsuccessfully persuade her 
recalcitrant husband and remain handicapped by halacha, turning her 
into a lifelong agunah.122 
A. Religious Implications of the Agunah Problem  
The requirement that a husband grant his wife a get comes from 
Deuteronomy, stating: 
When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, then it 
cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes, 
because he hath found some unseemly thing in her, that 
he writeth her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it in her 
hand, and sendeth her out of his house.123 
This verse gives a man the authority to divorce his wife at his own 
discretion and, in time, many Jewish scholars have sought to protect 
women in these types of divorce proceedings by providing takkanot.124  
Today, this means that a husband must voluntarily execute the get, and 
the wife must voluntarily accept it.125  Takkanot would further allow 
either spouse to initiate the proceedings for divorce by summoning an 
 
the latter, the contract would be considered voidable, because it depends on whether the 
alleged conduct was considered improper. 
119 See infra Part III.B. 
120 See generally Breitowitz, supra note 1. 
121 Breitowitz, supra note 1. 
122 See infra Part III.B. 
123 Deuteronomy 24:1; see also Zornberg, supra note 9, at 708. 
124 Takkanot is “a legislative enactment by competent rabbinical authority to ameliorate the 
effects of an unduly harsh Biblical or Talmudic law or to enhance the social welfare.”  See 
Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 317 n.13. 
125 Zornberg, supra note 9, at 708. 
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appearance before the beth din.126  Lastly, where the rabbinic 
authorities decide that a religious divorce is necessary, the beth din can 
compel the husband to give it.127   
There are restrictions placed on rabbinical courts by Jewish 
law.128  First, the husband retains the power to give a get, and, absent 
his consent, a rabbinical court cannot simply declare her divorced.129  
Second, a get must be given under the husband’s own free will for it to 
be deemed valid under halachic laws.130  However, the issue is not one 
of compulsion, but rather the issue is whether rabbinical courts can 
enforce such an order given its limitations.131 
An agunah is a woman that is “chained” to what essentially is 
a dead marriage.132  Although she may have the desire to end her 
marriage and move on with her life, she is unable to do so because she 
has not been released under religious law.133  According to Jewish law, 
a woman cannot remarry unless there is clear evidence that her 
husband died or gave her a get.134  In the past, most women fell victim 
to disappearing husbands.135  Husbands who were businessmen and 
travelled a lot were killed and their bodies were disposed of.136  
Husbands who were soldiers were sent off to war with the possibility 
to never return.137  This led to the rise of the main categories of agunah 
today.138  A wife becomes an agunah when: 
1. A man divorces his wife in the civil courts and 
possibly even remarries, but refuses to give his wife 
a get, either because of malice or greed. All too 
 
126 Zornberg, supra note 9, at 708. 
127 Zornberg, supra note 9, at 709. 
128 See infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. 
129 However, there are some rabbis, such as Rabbi Moshe Antelman, who believe a beth din 
may give a get under its own discretion in certain scenarios.  Zornberg, supra note 9, at 772. 
130 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
131 See infra note 141. 
132 See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
134 TALMUD, Gittin 3a.  The deliverance of a get has a witness requirement.  Id. 
135 Robert Gordis, Agunot: A Different Kind of Hostage, MY JEWISH LEARNING, 
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/agunot-a-different-kind-of-hostage/ (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2018). Dr. Robert Gordis taught over half a century at the Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
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often the husband tries to extort money from this 
wife in exchange for the get.  
2. A man disappears without leaving a trace, so that he 
is not available to issue the divorce . . . .139 
3. The man is lost in military action or dies in a mass 
explosion. . . .140 
The agunah problem has always been a big challenge for 
Jewish authorities.141  Scholars of the Talmud have recognized the 
devastating outcome for a woman with the status of agunah and have 
created various halachic “leniencies” in an attempt to lessen the 
problem.142  However, as one may come to find out, the agunah 
problem is nothing new.143  The problem arises given the contractual 
nature of Jewish marriage and divorce.144  Interestingly, although the 
Talmud discusses the issues involving husbands who disappear and 
various “leniencies,” the Talmud does not offer annulment as a 
solution for spousal abandonment.145   
Because the Jewish perception of the contractual nature of 
marriage and divorce, the issue involving spousal abandonment and 
the refusal of a husband to participate under his own free will causes 
 
139 MICHAEL J. BROYDE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND THE ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH LAW: 
A CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGUNAH PROBLEMS IN AMERICA 6 (2001) (“With the 
movement of large segments of the Jewish community from Eastern Europe to America, a 
new form of agunah problem arose.  A husband would emigrate to America, promising to send 
for his wife when he accumulated enough money to support her, and would then disappear. . . 
. As a general proposition. . . . [a solution] declaring the husband to be dead were few and far 
between.”). Under these circumstances, the rabbinical authorities started to prompt men who 
traveled to either write out a get before leaving or give authority to the beth din to do so. 
140 Gordis, supra note 137 (“During the Russo-Japanese war or 1905, some great Russian 
rabbis visited the troops before they left for the front and persuaded the Jewish soldiers to issue 
. . . a conditional divorce so as to free their wives from the status of agunah should the men 
fail to return.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
141 This is an issue that many Jewish authorities grapple with because, as halacha mandates, 
giving a get is a direct right given to men.  See generally KENNETH SEESKIN, JEWISH MESSIANIC 
THOUGHTS IN AN AGE OF DESPAIR (2012).  Furthermore, the law cannot be rewritten or removed 
because of the codification of the thirteen core principles of Jewish belief by scholar and 
philosopher, Maimonides.  See generally id.  One of the codified principles is that the Torah 
is timeless and unchanging.  See generally id. 
142 TALMUD, Gittin 3a.  Generally, two witnesses are required when verifying marital status.  
See id.  With this law of “leniency” in place, the rabbis hold that one witness’s testimony is 
enough with regard to the get.  See id. 
143 See infra Part III.B. 
144 Compare it to transactions that involve other contractual obligations—issues that arise 
would implicate parties’ rights if one party wished to withdraw from the contract. 
145 See generally TALMUD, Gittin 3a. 
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there to be no a solution to this problem.146  While it seems that the 
solutions offered are the best that the rabbinic authorities can do to 
reach just results, the rise of the modern agunah problem shows that 
these solutions are not as just and successful as one may have hoped 
them to be.147 
B. The Modern Agunah Problem and its 
Developments 
Rabbinic authorities have been conscious of the unjust results 
that may arise during religious divorce proceedings, as today the get 
has been used as a major vehicle for extortion.148  Because it is 
uncommon for people to disappear out of thin air, the agunah problem 
arises through the abuse of the get process.149 
In prior centuries, when Jews lived in very closely-knit, 
interdependent communities, extortion or refusal of the 
Get was almost unheard of, because the price the man 
would pay as an outcast in his community simply 
prevented such action.150 
With the rise of mobility and modern technology, which makes 
communication easier, it is less challenging to find people who have 
disappeared and verify other important information.151  However, it 
can be argued that the modern agunah problem bloomed out of the rise 
in mobility, and perhaps the loosening of community ties in the modern 
world.152  Today, husbands refuse to grant their wives a divorce, even 
 
146 See supra note 113.  The ketubah signed by the couple on their wedding day consists of 
promises that are made to the wife by the husband.  These promises are contractual. 
147 The fact that agunah women are still prevalent in the modern world and there are 
husbands that still refuse to issue a get is evident enough that the proposed solutions, such as 
the prenuptial agreements, are not as successful in their entirety.  See supra notes 99-103 and 
accompanying text.  This is especially important because there are rabbis who refuse to 
acknowledge the prenuptial as a halachically valid solution.  See supra notes 99-103 and 
accompanying text. 
148 Alexandra Leichter, The Effect of Jewish Divorce Law on Family Law Litigation, IAFL 
(Oct. 1, 2009), at 9, http://www.iafl.com/cms_media/files/the_effect_of_jewish_divorce_law 
_on_family_law_litigation.pdf?static=1 (“Rabbis have not been unmindful of this inequity in 
Jewish divorce law and the potential for major extortion.”). 
149 See generally BROYDE, supra note 139. 
150 Leichter, supra note 148. 
151 BROYDE, supra note 139, at 7-8 (“Modern technology has made it easy to communicate. 
People who wish to be found are found.  Death is much more easily verifiable, and facts are 
generally clearer.”). 
152 See generally BROYDE, supra note 139, at 7-8. 
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if it clashes with a rabbinical order to do so.153  Ultimately, they are 
motivated by sheer spite, unhappiness with divorce settlements, or 
custody agreements.154  This leads the recalcitrant husband who uses 
the get as a bargaining chip or leverage against his wife.155 
In more recent years, rabbinical courts have not accounted for 
the vast significance of interference when they see husbands 
purposefully hold their wives hostage to a marriage by refusing her the 
get.156  On a comparative level, the Israeli system combines secular 
law and religious law.157  This permits the rabbinic courts to “order 
imprisonment, [revoke] driver’s and professional license, and [impose] 
other penalties . . . on a ‘recalcitrant’ husband, who refuse[s] to give 
his wife a Get.”158  Any rabbinical court, with the exception of the 
rabbinical courts in the State of Israel, functions similarly to arbitration 
courts in the United States.159 
Rabbinical courts in the United States possess the authority to 
compel a husband in giving his wife a get.160  However, the 
enforcement issues still persist.161  Unlike the courts in the State of 
Israel, rabbinical courts in the United States cannot use coercive 
methods at their disposal to force a recalcitrant husband to comply, nor 
can a court in the United States enforce coercive judgments set forth 
by the rabbinical courts.162  Thus, because Israel’s rabbinical court 
 
153 BROYDE, supra note 139, at 7-8. 
154 BROYDE, supra note 139, at 73. 
155 See generally BROYDE, supra note 139, at 73. 
156 As mentioned before, Rabbis have proposed solutions, i.e., prenuptial support 
agreements.  Despite the interference, not all solutions have been accepted and many Rabbis 
still refuse to interfere with the husband’s discretion in granting a get.  See supra note 103 and 
accompanying text.   
157 Leichter, supra note 148, at 10. 
158 Leichter, supra note 148, at 10; see also Yair Ettinger, Israel’s High Court Invokes 
Medieval Punishment for Husbands Who Refuse Jewish Ritual Divorce, HAARETZ (Mar. 01, 
2017, 4:23 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.774684.  Israel’s 
rabbinical court, in a 5-2 vote, held that aside from pursuing punitive charges, it can shun the 
husband and subject him to ostracizing by the community if he denies his wife a divorce.  Id.  
The court held that its authority was not exceeded when it publicly shamed those husbands 
and urged the community to stay away from “get refusers.”  Id.  It further publicly announced 
to not trade or pray with those who refused to give a get “until they set their wives free.”  Id. 
159 Leichter, supra note 148, at 10. 
160 Although the authority really depends on morals and applying community pressure, 
rabbinical courts in the United States do not have actual authority like Israeli courts do. 
161 See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
162 BROYDE, supra 139, at 9 (“The single most significant reason is that Jewish law has been 
emasculated since the emancipation.  Jewish law courts have been deprived of juridical 
authority and are powerless to impose obligations on individuals.  They have only moral and 
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prefers to order payments for the wife’s support as a way to push the 
husband toward giving her a get, it rarely uses coercive force against a 
noncomplying husband.163 
In its most recent case, the Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem 
attempted a settlement between the estranged couple, even though the 
case was active in America’s civil court.164  The couple lived in New 
York and filed for divorce in the Beth Din of America.165  However, 
the husband refused to appear before the rabbinical court.166  The court 
issued a seruv against him and banned members of the synagogue from 
getting involved in any type of economic or social transaction with 
him.167  Despite the sanctions, he still refused to give her a get; the wife 
then contacted organizations in Israel for assistance.168  The court held 
that jurisdiction over the religious divorce proceedings was proper 
because the husband was a citizen and resident; therefore, the court 
issued a ban because he was a flight risk and could have potentially 
fled the country leaving the wife “chained” in a marriage against her 
will.169 
In another recent Israeli case, the rabbinical court sentenced a 
man to five years in prison because he refused to give his wife a get.170  
The Israeli rabbis have implemented a “policy of stringent 
 
ethical authority.  This situation makes the emasculated Jewish law courts impotent, and vastly 
exacerbates the modern agunah problem in America.”). 
163 BROYDE, supra 139, at 10 (“They are inclined to require counseling, therapy, mediation, 
and other techniques of reconciliation as alternatives to divorce, particularly when there are 
children in the marriage.”). 
164 Jeremy Sharon, Rabbinical Court Infringes on U.S. Civil Jurisdiction in 8-Year Agunah 
Case, JERUSALEM POST (July 14, 2017, 2:50 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Rabbinical-
court-infringes-on-US-civil-jurisdiction-in-8-year-agunah-case-499686 (“Lawyers for the 
aguna[h] say that the case is a classic example of the problematic phenomenon of rabbinical 
courts trying the right of a woman to get divorced to her acceptance of a financial settlement, 




168 Id.  Her husband was a citizen and resident of Israel; thus, contacting these organizations 
made them aware of her uphill battle with her husband regarding their religious divorce and 
would allow the rabbinical courts to get involved.  See Sharon, supra note 164.  Consequently, 
leading up to the rabbinical court banning the husband from leaving Israel.  See Sharon, supra 
note 164. 
169 Sharon, supra note 164.  The court further stated that it lacked jurisdiction over matters 
regarding child support and division of assets because these issues were pending before the 
civil courts in the United States.  See Sharon, supra note 164. 
170 JTA, Israeli Man Gets 5 years in Prison for Refusing Wife a Divorce, FORWARD (July 
15, 2016), http://forward.com/news/breaking-news/345201/israeli-man-gets-5-years-in- 
prison-for-refusing-wife-a-divorce/. 
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punishments against husbands.”171  This policy included publishing the 
husbands’ names, where they worked, and other details that would 
identify them.172  The objective behind these actions is to publicly 
humiliate the husbands into freeing their wives.173  Consequently, the 
husband still refused to comply with the court’s orders to give his wife 
a get, which led the court to its decision—issue an injunction that 
placed a travel ban, order him to surrender his passport, and freeze all 
of his bank accounts.174  The judges responded with the following 
statement: 
Imprisoning a person is not easy and is in fact an 
extraordinary and harsh measure. But the husband 
leaves the court no other alternative as outweighing the 
pain that the sentence involves in the Halacha [Jewish 
law] given to the sages of Israel, which requires the 
court to do everything within its power to redeem a 
woman from her chains.175 
Taking away a noncomplying husband’s liberty may be a harsh 
punishment, but perhaps by placing him in physical chains, it will help 
him understand the consequences of his actions and how detrimental 
his actions can be when he chooses to keep his wife religiously 
chained.176  The importance of this Israeli decision lies in the rabbinical 
courts’ acknowledgment that religious chains placed on an agunah can 
be equally limiting as placing a person in physical chains.177 
In one of most extreme cases known, a seventy-year-old 
Brooklyn rabbi, Mendel Epstein, was convicted for ten years for 
initiating and leading a violent coalition of Jewish men who would use 
coercive and violent means to force husbands into giving their wives a 




173 Id.  In the case, the panel of judges stated that “the husband [left] the court [with] no 
other alternative.”  Id. 
174 JTA, supra note 170.  Despite all of this, the husband stated, “I will never give her a get. 
Even if she gives me back the apartment and the property, my tefillin and prayer shawl, she 
will not receive a get.”  JTA, supra note 170.  To this, the rabbis responded by suspending his 
arrest for 10 days, hoping that this would encourage him to let her go.  See JTA, supra note 
170. 
175 JTA, supra note 170 (alteration in original). 
176 See generally JTA, supra note 170. 
177 See generally JTA, supra note 170. 
178 Reuven Blau, Brooklyn Rabbi Gets 10 Years for Leading a Gang of Men Who Beat Up 
Jewish Husbands Reluctant to Divorce Their Unhappy Wives, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 15, 
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torture, and assault, some rabbis further believe that the actions of 
Epstein and his “gang” should be heavily sanctioned for they were 
inhumane.179  Although these acts were inhumane and illegal, the 
arrests brought “national attention [to] the anguished situation . . . and 
perhaps will help put legal pressure on husbands who have separated 
from their wives but refuse to allow them to re-marry.”180  Though 
Epstein is no martyr, his drastic actions further exposed the great need 
for some sort of systematic solution that is deeply rooted in halachic 
laws.181 
In more recent years, the agunah problem has made its way up 
to the surface.182  The inevitable question frequently pondered, that 
does not necessarily have a definitive answer, is whether there is a 
possible solution.183  Unfortunately, secular law cannot do much for 
women in these situations.184  The granting of a get is completely a 
religious matter; thus, secular courts can only go as far as making a 
judgment that it cannot necessarily and specifically enforce.185  Many 
active organizations advocate for the rights of agunots by taking action 
such as public shaming.186 
 
2015, 3:33 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/rabbi-10-years-beating-jewish-men-
resisting-divorce-article-1.2466800.  Rabbi Epstein is commonly referred to as “The 
Prodfather,” for he charged wives a large sum of money to torture their husbands into 
complying.  Id.  Some of these torturous acts included kidnapping, beating, handcuffing, and 
electrocuting them with prods until the husbands agreed.  Id. 
179 See generally Tzvi Ben-Gedalyahu, FBI Arrests NY Rabbis for Beating Husbands Who 
Refuse Divorce, JEWISH PRESS (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.jewishpress.com/news/fbi-arrests-
ny-rabbis-for-beating-husbands-refusing-divorce/2013/10/10/. 
180 Id. 
181 See generally id. 
182 With the help of Jewish rabbis, like Epstein, who have acknowledged the problem and 
organizations that have and continue to take a proactive stance on this issue.  See infra note 
188 and accompanying text. 
183 See infra Part IV.  Indubitably, there is a clash between civil law and halachic law.  
Ultimately, the clash stems from the need to protect First Amendment rights while offering 
help to agunot under civil law can and the need to preserve the text of the Torah by religious 
adherents. 
184 See infra Part IV. 
185 See infra Part IV. 
186 A prominent New York-based nonprofit organization called, Organization for the 
Resolution of Agunot (ORA), advocates for the rights of the agunot and supports a universal 
adoption of the Jewish prenuptial agreement.  Mark Oppenheimer, Religious Divorce Dispute 
Leads to Secular Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/us/ 
04divorce.html.  This organization stages protests in front of a noncomplying husband’s 
(sometimes a noncomplying wife who refuses to accept the get) home or place of work and 
actively raises awareness by forcing financial and legal pressures onto him (or her).  See 
generally id.; see also Doree Lewak, An Orthodox Woman’s 3-Year Divorce Fight, N.Y. POST 
23
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Abolishing the get requirement as a whole is not a solution for 
the Orthodox community.187  It may be that, perhaps, the only plausible 
solution would be a communal agreement to reinterpret the halachic 
laws of divorce in situations where the wife may successfully exit her 
marriage in accordance with halacha.188  However, as of now, agunot 
can continue to fight against get refusal and remain hopeful for an 
improved, halachically-accepted development.189 
IV. THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM AS A REMEDY  
The New York Get Law, amended into the Domestic Relations 
Law Section 253,190 is an example of secular law coming to the aid of 
the agunah problem.191  This very controversial legislation was 
enacted with the goal of “ensur[ing] that persons who do not give or 
receive [a get] will be unable to receive the benefits of a civil 
divorce.”192  The statute states that a party cannot receive an annulment 
or divorce unless the party claims in a verified complaint that the party 
took all the steps necessary, to the best of his or her knowledge, to 
remove any barrier to the defendant’s remarriage.193  Furthermore, the 
court must “defer entering final judgment until the plaintiff files with 
the court and serves on the other party a sworn statement of actual 
compliance.”194  Even though the court does not have the authority 
over inquiring into the factual basis of a sworn statement, knowingly 
submitting a false statement may lead to a criminal proceeding for 
perjury.195  Included in the “barriers to remarriage” would be “religious 
 
(Nov. 04, 2013, 6:43 PM), https://nypost.com/2013/11/04/orthodox-jewish-womans-plea-for-
a-divorce/.   
187 See generally KENNETH SEESKIN, MAIMONIDES ON THE ORIGIN OF THE WORLD (2005).  
One of the core principles of Jewish law is that the Torah is timeless and unchanging. 
188 As the rabbis once reinterpreted a woman’s grounds for divorce.  See BROYDE, supra 
139, at 19 (“Soon after the close of the Talmudic period, the rabbis of that time (called geonim) 
changed or reinterpreted the substantive understanding of Jewish law to vastly increase the 
right of a woman to sue for divorce.”). 
189 See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 186. 
190 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1986). 
191 See Masri v. Masri, 50 N.Y.S.3d 801 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (“It is clear from the legislative 
history that it was precisely this purported unfairness of a Jewish husband’s refusal to provide 
a Get that drove the enactment of the [DRL § 253]. . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). 
192 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 375. 
193 § 253.  With its adoption, questions of whether its enactment violated the First 
Amendment arose. 
194 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 376; see also § 253(3)(i). 
195 § 253(8); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 1986) (making a knowingly 
false statement is a Class E felony that is punishable by at least four years in prison). 
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or conscientious restraints or inhibitions.”196  Therefore, not executing 
a get would constitute a barrier and would limit the husband’s ability 
to truthfully file an affidavit for a civil divorce.197 
The get law was challenged, although unsuccessfully, under the 
First Amendment.198  The First Amendment states that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”199  Inevitably, the get law creates a conflict 
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.200  
Challengers of the get law arguably believe that judicial intervention 
would violate a person’s constitutional right to free exercise, which 
provides that religion must be kept as a private matter; otherwise, it 
would constitute an impermissible establishment of religion.201  
Furthermore, there is a lot of halachic criticism of the get law because 
it “improperly diminishes the capacity of the husband and wife to offer 
and receive a get with free will, a requirement of Jewish law.”202 
 
196 § 253(6). 
197 See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.  As mentioned, the court does not 
necessarily have the authority to inquire whether the affidavit is truthful or not.  However, if 
the husband would want to take that risk, he would be subjecting himself to a criminal action 
of perjury.  This legislation was created with the intent to help wives obtain a get.  
Consequently, Governor Cuomo stated, “If there was such a precedent, I would defer to it . . . 
[but] [g]iven the clarity of the need, the efficiency of this statutory solution and the uncertainty 
of the constitutional objection, I approve this measure.”  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 375. 
198 See Chambers v. Chambers, 471 N.Y.S.2d 958, 960 (Sup. Ct. 1983).  Chambers is the 
only case that actually addresses the statute’s constitutionality though in dicta.  Id.  The court 
noted 
It might very well be argued that the aspect of the get statute herein 
under scrutiny constitutes a denial of due process in that it requires a 
plaintiff to seek an undesired item of relief in order to obtain a desired 
item. It might further be argued, at least for the reason that there is no way 
to extract a removal of barriers statement from a defendant, that the 
requirement is as much a denial of due process as would be a law 
preventing the entry of a judgment . . . .  
All of the foregoing is unnecessary to the determination at bar. 
Id.; see also Friedenberg v. Friedenberg, 523 N.Y.S.2d 578, 581 (App. Div. 1988). 
199 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
200 See infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
201 See generally BROYDE, supra note 139, at 141. 
202 BROYDE, supra note 139, at 103.  Broyde continues by saying  
the threat of economic penalty undermines the free will needed by Jewish 
law, and a get given without free will can be void according to Jewish law. 
This criticism stands in contrast to the approval given to the earlier Get 
Law, which merely withheld a civil divorce in certain circumstances until 
a religious divorce was granted. 
BROYDE, supra note 139, at 103. 
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman,203 the Supreme Court created a test that 
would indicate whether a state statute impermissibly established a 
religion.204  The Lemon test yields three prongs: first, the statute must 
have a legitimate state interest; second, the statute’s primary effect 
must neither advance nor inhibit religion; finally, the statute cannot 
promote excessive entanglement between the government and 
religion.205  The test would hold a law that accommodates a certain 
religious practice valid if it satisfies the three prongs.206  Furthermore, 
when a statute is challenged under the Free Exercise clause, often the 
challenger concedes that the failure to apply the provision in a way that 
would exempt certain religious practices infringes on religious 
liberty.207  The test employed when individuals challenge the Free 
Exercise clause is one of “general applicability.”208 
The state has a legitimate state interest by addressing the free 
exercise of a secular state interest.209  Here, the purpose is not only to 
 
203 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  This test is still applied today, although it is unclear whether these 
prongs function as elements or factors to be considered.  Case law subsequent to Lemon would 
indicate that regardless whether the prongs are elements or factors, excessive entanglement 
between the government and religion is important when analyzing the constitutionality of a 
statute under the Establishment Clause.  See generally Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 
330 U.S. 1 (1947); see also Bd. of Ed. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).  
Notably, before Lemon, the Court upheld state statutes that allowed for parents of students 
enrolled in private and public schools to be reimbursed of transportation costs and provided 
textbooks to parochial schools for secular purposes, arguing that the money provided to the 
schools were not related to religious purposes.  See generally id.  In Lemon, however, the Court 
held a state program, which provided parochial school teachers with salary supplements, 
invalid.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.  The majority opinion noted the distinction between 
textbooks and salary supplements, reasoning that the parochial school teachers would be able 
to advance religious texts even when teaching secular subjects and taken in tandem, the state 
would be excessively entangling itself with religious purposes by providing salary 
supplements.  Id. at 612. 
204 Id. at 612. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 919 (1990).  The 
majority opinion held that the First Amendment’s protection of the free exercise of religion 
does not allow a person to use a religious motivation as a reason not to follow a generally 
applicable law.  Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1990) (“To 
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of 
the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”)). 
208 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.  The majority concluded that generally applicable laws that 
impose a burden on religion are not subject to the compelling interest test.  Id.  Under that 
standard, nondiscriminatory (general) laws should be analyzed under a rational basis test, 
which shows more deference to legislation than the compelling interest test would.  Id.  A 
rational basis test would hold a law constitutional so long as there is a rational or legitimate 
purpose behind it.  Id.   
209 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
26
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss3/5
2018 CHAINED AGAINST HER WILL 783 
facilitate a right to privacy, as established through case law, but to 
facilitate a recognized fundamental right to marriage, and arguably the 
right to a divorce falls under its penumbra.210  As a general argument, 
the state has a legitimate interest in promoting the opportunity of its 
citizens to exercise and enjoy the constitutional rights afforded to 
them.211  Although the issue arises from a private actor rather than a 
public actor, states should have the power, especially in similar 
situations, to protect its citizens from infringement created by private 
actors.212 
When a husband withholds a get out of sheer spite or attempts 
to use the get as a scheme to gain a financial advantage over his wife, 
the state has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from 
coercion.213  Furthermore, many states have accepted intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as a tort and states should be able to use 
the prevention of human suffering as a legitimate state interest.214 
In short, the justifications for the New York law appear 
to be secular in purpose: the furtherance of the state’s 
divorce policy, the validation of the integrity of the 
judicial system, the facilitation of religious liberty, the 
encouraging of remarriage and a more stable family 
life, the protection of fundamental rights of privacy, and 
the curbing of victimization and extortion all appear to 
fall within the traditional ambit of general legislative 
competence. . . . [T]he “secular purpose” prong of 
Lemon can be easily satisfied.215 
 
210 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the fundamental right to 
privacy); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing that the fundamental 
right to marry, established before the right to privacy, is protected by the Due Process Clause).   
211 See generally supra note 203.  Courts apply the rational basis test when considering 
constitutional questions.  It determines whether a law is rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.  Generally, states have an inherent police power to promote the general 
welfare of its citizens, where one may argue that general welfare includes a citizen’s right to 
exercise and enjoy his or her constitutional rights.   
212 See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), which coined a limitation 
known as the “state action” doctrine, indicating that constitutional rights may be argued 
against the government or its agents.   
213 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 386. 
214 See Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 386; see also, Daniel J. Givelbar, The Right to Minimum 
Social Decency and the Limits of Even-handedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 43 (1982) (listing jurisdictions that 
recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress as a tort). 
215 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 386. 
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The second prong may be somewhat problematic, because it requires 
that the statute’s primary effect neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.216  A statute that “indirectly compels an unwilling party to 
perform a religious act, even if there are legitimate secular purposes . 
. . seems to have the ‘effect’ of advancing religious observance.”217  
However, just because the statute may have some effect, it does not 
necessarily make the statute invalid because the prong requires a 
“primary” effect.218  Nevertheless, it can be argued that the statute 
facilitates religion in certain respects.219  For instance, it could create a 
lesser hurdle on observers of Orthodox Judaism by helping adherents 
remove barriers they would have not been able to cross otherwise.220  
Furthermore, though indirectly, it can force people into complying 
with religious practices that would not have been complied with but 
for the statute.221 
Excessive entanglement, the third prong of the test, would 
occur if the statute required continuous monitoring over the religious 
practice or institution.222  Once the court receives the affidavit, the 
court must enter the judgment and need not inquire about the 
truthfulness of it.223 
Issues concerning the technical validity of the get, the 
qualifications of the executing Rabbis, and whether the 
principles of the officiating clergyman have or have not 
been met and what those principles are—questions that 
could indeed entangle the court in complex doctrinal 
matters—pose matters that the court simply does not 
and may not address.224 
 
216 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
217 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 387. 
218 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 387. 
219 See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. 
220 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 386. 
221 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 386.  A noncomplying husband may be encouraged to give 
his wife a get if he is seeking a civil divorce.  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 386.  Breitowitz 
notes that “the ‘effect’ of making the practice of Judaism less burdensome on its willing 
practitioners is probably nothing more than a permissible accommodation of free exercise and 
does not offend Lemon’s ‘primary effect’ criterion.”  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 386 (citation 
omitted). 
222 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
223 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(9) (McKinney 1986) (The truth of any statement submitted 
pursuant to this section shall not be the subject of any judicial inquiry. . . .”).  Thus, the affidavit 
is conclusive.  § 253(2)-(4). 
224 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 389. 
28
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss3/5
2018 CHAINED AGAINST HER WILL 785 
As the statute indicates, the only way to contest the submitted affidavit 
would be if the clergyman filed an affidavit and testified in a way that 
went contrary to the other one.225 
The Get Law has not been successfully challenged thus far 
under the Establishment Clause.226  Although critics of the law have 
attempted to argue for its unconstitutionality, the law has remained, 
and, one hopes, will continue to remain, valid because it does not raise 
threatening problems under the Free Exercise Clause as well.227  “A 
careful examination of the get law, however, demonstrates that the 
unwilling spouse’s free exercise rights are not truly impaired.”228  
When using this statute, the court cannot directly compel a plaintiff to 
comply because the terms of the statute merely places a condition to 
remove barriers before being granted a civil divorce.229  Though 
promoting a wife’s right to free exercise would probably not be a state 
interest sufficient enough to stand on its own, there are many other 
important state interests that would need protection.230  Consequently, 
the enactment of the Get Law decreased the amount of agunot in New 
York, despite the legal and religious challenges made against it.231 
V. CONCLUSION 
In writing this Note, I have attempted to recognize the various 
civil remedies available for Jewish women who are unable to receive 
 
The purpose of the law is to advance purely secular interests, 
including the facilitation of free exercise by those who otherwise would 
be burdened because of their religious beliefs. The primary effect of the 
law is not the “endorsement” . . . of religion[.] . . . [it] simply equalizes 
the rights of women holding certain beliefs with those of women who do 
not. Nor does the law invite excessive entanglement into religious affairs 
because the court is prohibited from inquiring into the truth of any matters 
alleged in the affidavit. 
Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 392. 
225 § 253(7). 
226 See generally Breitowitz, supra note 1. 
227 Breitowitz, supra note 1. 
228 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 394. 
229 Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 394. 
230 Enhancing the wife’s right to free exercise while infringing on the husband’s would 
seem counterintuitive. However, the state has other interests that it would want to protect.  As 
mentioned before, “the furtherance of the state’s divorce policy, the validation of the integrity 
of the judicial system, the facilitation of religious liberty, the encouraging of remarriage and a 
more stable family life, the protection of fundamental rights of privacy, and the curbing of 
victimization and extortion. . . .”  Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 386. 
231 See generally Breitowitz, supra note 1. 
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a get because of recalcitrant husbands who use their religious power to 
extort their wives.232  Whether motivated by sheer spite, financial 
pursuits, or custody grounds, being denied a get is a heavy burden 
placed on adherents of halachic law.233  When a Jewish couple signs a 
ketubah, they implicitly agree to act in accordance with the laws of 
“Moses and Israel” and the state in which they marry.234  For such 
individuals, halachic laws serve as their guiding principles throughout 
the couple’s lives (i.e., during marriage or divorce).235  A couple can 
only hope for a “clean” divorce, one in which it would not resort to a 
brutal battle amongst former spouses, and in similar situations, a battle 
with an inherent loser.236 
Furthermore, I have fervently contended that civil enforcement 
of the get process is valid, though many scholars and critics of civil 
involvement in religious proceedings have argued adversely.237  
Although the get requirement is found in the Torah, a text that cannot 
be changed, religious leaders and civil courts have implemented 
prenuptial support agreements and have used the ketubah as an implied 
promise to secure a get.238  I presented a legal argument that the New 
York Get Law, codified in the Domestic Relations Law § 253, does 
not violate the First Amendment.239  Consequently, the Get Law is not 
deemed unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause or the Free 
Exercise Clause because there are many state interests that require 
protection under such circumstances.240  The number of agunot in New 
York has decreased because of the enactment of the Get Law and 
organizations that assist with this issue.241 
Challenges to the New York Get Law may very well continue 
to be unsuccessful.242  However, whether the judgment remains 
halachically valid, is a question that will remain open for presumably 
a long time because of all the differing opinions concerning the 
 
232 See supra Part III. 
233 See supra Part III. 
234 See supra Part III. 
235 See supra Part III. 
236 See supra Part III.A (explaining why the wife is the inherent loser in divorce proceedings 
when the husband refuses to give her a get, making her into an agunah). 
237 See supra Part II. 
238 See supra Part II. 
239 See supra Part IV. 
240 See supra Part IV. 
241 See supra Part III. 
242 See supra Part IV. 
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question.243  The fact that such questions are still contemplated 
emphasizes the dilemmas that encompass agunot during Jewish 
divorce proceedings.244  Since the get right lies in the hands of the 
husband alone, as mandated by Jewish law, certain rabbis delay their 
involvement because of the fear and inability to undermine the 
important halachic doctrines.245  A determinative factor of the get lies 
with the free will of the husband rather than equity for the agunah, 
which leaves such women with virtually no real solution.246  Though 
individuals affected by this situation remain hopeful for a more 
halachically accepted solution, I have shown the legislative and 
judicial desire, and ability, to generate various solutions in an attempt 
to remove the chains and free agunot from their dead marriages.247 
 
243 See supra Part IV. 
244 See supra Part III. 
245 See supra Part III. 
246 See supra Part III. 
247 See supra Part IV. 
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